ndia has just witnessed another dangerous and horrifying attack by Naxals. The Maoist guerrillas slaughtered seventy-five Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and a lone Chhattisgarh policeman in the forests of Dantewada district in Bastar region on April 06.
Home Minister P Chidambaram has even offered to step down in the wake of the brutal attack that left him “shocked”. Albeit the “buck stops at his desk”, yet the Home Minister’s resignation would not have helped in stopping the menace called Naxalism.
Prakash Singh is former director general of the Border Security Force.
Biplob: What are the reasons behind the Dantewada massacre? Why did it happen?
Singh: It happened because security forces are trying to regain the area where the Naxals have established their sway. In the process, they carried out an operation but during this, the CRPF unit committed a number of operational blunders for which they paid a heavy price.
Biplob: Why did the security forces fail to thwart such an attack?
Singh: They failed because they did not observe the general rules of jungle warfare. First, when you are moving in a jungle you shouldn’t be using a vehicle; you should be travelling on foot. Second, when you are using a particular route to go somewhere, you should never use the same route while returning, as they did in this case.
When you are travelling and there is any high ground along the route, one should send a road opening party to make sure that there is nobody hiding along the high ground. The high ground needs to be captured and dominance should be established and then only the forces should be asked to move on. There was high ground, which they ignored.
There were, according to the DGP, Chhattisgarh, reports of a huge infiltration of Maoists from the contiguous areas. It all appears to have been ignored by the CRPF. So, it is surprising that with such massive presence and movement of Maoists in the area, the CRPF didn’t have any specific warning about their possible plan to strike at forces.
The state police should take the lead role in counter-insurgency operations. The paramilitary forces can only play the supporting role. However, at the ground level it appears that at most of the places, it is the central forces which are taking the initiative and the state police are playing a subsidiary role, sometimes merely providing a guide, as it appears to have been the case in the Dantewada incident. The equation must be set right.
